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State, Power and Global Order1 
Dr Or Rosenboim 
 
Abstract: This article examines the evolution of international thought 
through the notion of ‘political space’. It focuses on two important domains 
of international politics, the nation-state and the global, to reflect on the 
discipline’s spatial categories. Since its inception, the concept of the nation-
state has dominated mainstream International Relations (IR) theory. Yet an 
investigation of how international order has been theorised over IR’s first 
century shows that this era has also been defined by globalist visions of 
political order. This study reviews the interplay of the state and the global 
sphere, using Barbara Ward’s analysis of equality and development to shed 
light on the interplay of the global and the national spaces. Nowadays, 
                                                 
1 I wish to thank the journal's anonymous reviewers for their insightful 
comments on earlier drafts of the article, and the editors for their help and 
support.  
 
 2 
globalization is sometimes seen as the apex of the historical interplay of 
particularity and universality. The progression towards global political and 
economic order, however, is today undermined by the resurgence of state-
centric political nationalism which seeks to challenge the legitimacy of the 
global political space. 
 
Keywords: Globalization; Nationalism; Globalism; International Order; 
International Relations; State 
 
 
Introduction: Political spaces and International Relations 
 
The concept of political space, already frequently discussed by political 
geographers, has received over the last two decades the attention of 
International Relations (IR) scholars.1 It may seem a truism to argue that 
the study of international relations is based on assumptions regarding space 
and spatiality. In this context, political space can be understood as the 
broad dynamic webs of political and symbolic relations evolving within, 
around and in relation to topographical physical settings and terrestrial 
landscapes.2 Yet the interplay of spatial configurations and international 
relations theory has not been thoroughly mapped. What spatial domains 
have international relations theorists considered important, and why? How 
did transformations of spatial perceptions influence ideas about 
international relations?  
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This article seeks to demonstrate the close interplay of the national and 
global political spaces in international thought in the first century of IR, 
drawing on the concept of political space as an insightful interpretative 
framework in international relations. The concept of ‘political space’ 
embodies the multiple ways in which politics and geographical territory 
continue to be related. These relations are not passive or deterministic; 
spatial conditions can define political order, but space is also shaped by 
political power. Conquest, law-making, border formation and war are some 
of the activities that modify space and give it political meaning. I will look at 
two categories of political space that were conceptually and politically 
important in American and British international thought in the first century 
of the discipline of IR: the nation-state and the global. It argues that in the 
last century, the nation-state and the global were considered by 
international thinkers as important domains of international thought, and 
seeks to understand how transformations in spatial perceptions, generated 
by technological and political changes, shaped ideas about international 
relations. By examining how past international thinkers imagined and 
interpreted the relations of space and politics in the national and global 
spheres, I suggest that spatial thinking offers an insightful approach for 
theorizing international relations.  
 
In the twentieth century, the nation-state was the protagonist in the study 
of international relations. Discussions about space and spatiality within IR 
focused on the inexhaustible debate between the persistence vs. the 
disappearance of the territorial state as the principle form of political 
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organization in the Westphalian system.3 In the 1940s, the political 
desirability and adequacy of the post-1919 system of nation-states was 
challenged by a new political outlook emphasising the importance of the 
global domain of political order.4 While these debates date to the mid-
twentieth century, they clearly resonate with more recent arguments that 
the processes of globalization supposedly dealt the final blow to the nation-
state’s political and economic sovereign power.5 In 1919-2019, the nation-
state and the global embodied two important spatial categories for theorizing 
international relations: their conceptual histories within the discipline of IR 
offer a glimpse into alternative past and future trajectories for spatial 
political thought. The analysis of political space gives rise to important 
questions about the location of practical and conceptual sites of power. The 
political space of the global, and its related categories ‘globalism’ and 
‘globality’ will provide an alternative framework for thinking about political 
power beyond the state.  
 
By juxtaposing the national and global spaces of politics, this article seeks 
to trace the conceptualization and location of power in the twentieth century 
world order. To do so, I propose to examine the political ideas and spatial 
interpretations of a variety of international thinkers, who will offer a lens 
through which to analyse change and continuity in the international sphere. 
The British and American thinkers at the core of this study have all 
contributed in different ways to the evolution of international thought 
within, and outside of, the academic discipline of International Relations. 
These figures include Alfred Zimmern, Barbara Ward, Hans Morgenthau, E. 
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H. Carr and John Herz. Despite their theoretical and political differences, 
they were all original and influential international thinkers who shared a 
concern with the desirable and possible relations of the political spaces of 
the nation-state and the global. Together, this group highlights the 
pluralistic quality of spatial thinking in the first century of IR. The selection 
of thinkers is not exhaustive or comprehensive; instead, it aims to inspire 
further investigation of past ideas about the spaces of international 
relations.  
 
The history of international thought provides this study with an 
interpretative method to investigate the ways in which political spaces were 
conceptualised by scholars of IR.6 Some scholars, like Nicolas Guilhot, 
Duncan Bell and David Armitage, have diagnosed a ‘rapprochement’ 
between historians of political thought and IR scholars, leading to a new 
wave of literature on the history of international thought and on the 
disciplinary history of IR.7 Scholars of history, law and international 
relations have become more attentive to the international, transnational and 
global dimensions of past ideas, and have sought to expand our 
understanding of the development of political spaces beyond the state.8 I 
suggest that historical investigations in IR can help understand and explain 
how spatial conceptions have changed and evolved in international thought. 
 
Looking back at the plurality of competing visions of world order in the first 
century of IR, it is clear that the evolution of international thought is not a 
linear process, but an intricate and complex genealogy with false starts, 
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alternative trajectories and unrealized endeavours. Understanding the role 
played by spatial categories notably the nation-state and the global in 
visions of world order can expand our historical knowledge. But this 
intellectual exercise can also provide sharper conceptual tools for 
contemporary international theory to interpret and critique the spatial 
categories of international relations. The argument about spatial categories 
begins by surveying the rise of the nation-state.  
 
The space of the nation-state 
 
‘Few concepts in International Relations are as controversial and enduring – 
yet as neglected and under-theorized – as the concepts of the state and 
sovereignty’.9 This assertion, by IR scholar Peter Stirk, reflects the tensions 
around statehood in IR theory, which endows the territorial nation-state 
with ‘mortal God’ status without scrutinizing its conceptual qualities and 
analytical characteristics. For scholars like Michael Mann, the nation-state 
in the discipline’s early days,  was considered the embodiment of 
modernity.10 Nation-states were able to make powerful claims on individual 
allegiance and collective identity, extending their political and symbolic 
influence to the realm of emotions, morality and norms. Other scholars 
describe the post-1919 formation of equal and autonomous nation-states as 
one of the ‘foundational myths’ of IR and challenged its historical 
accuracy.11  
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While discussions of the historical and conceptual origins of the modern 
nation-state remain beyond the scope of this article, it is significant to note 
the spatial implications of statehood in international theory, and in 
particular the notion of ‘territoriality’.12 In 1994, Agnew argued that IR 
theorists such as Keohane, Gilpin and Waltz rely excessively on a simplistic 
interpretation of the nation-state defined by its capacity to exert power 
within its territory, and to exclude intervention from outside its borders. IR 
theory has thus increasingly seen the state as the location where social 
processes take place. According to this account, the boundaries of the state 
confine power to a specific territory and draw a neat distinction between 
internal and external politics.13 For Agnew, the misrepresentation of 
territory in IR theory resulted in the reification of the state as a fixed unit of 
sovereign space and to the production of research based on the artificial 
hermetic separation between internal and foreign affairs.14 More recently, 
other scholars took a page from Agnew’s critique of state-centrism, seeking 
to question the territorially-based interpretation of the state as a set and 
fixed unit of sovereignty by exploring, for example, the permeability of 
boundaries and the interaction of the private and public spheres.15 
 
After the First World War, the apparent overlap of modernity and statehood 
generated reflections on the desirable sites of political power, and on the 
appropriate mechanisms to guarantee peace. Such concerns encouraged the 
philanthropist and liberal politician David Davies and his sisters to donate 
the endowment for the foundation of the Woodrow Wilson Chair in 
International Politics at the University College of Wales in Aberystwyth. The 
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endowment was announced at the end of 1918, and the first professor, 
Alfred Zimmern, began work in April 1919.16 The chair was aimed not only 
at the advancement of knowledge but also at the realization of political 
goals, such as world peace, justice and security. Thus, the academic 
discipline of IR became part and parcel of the efforts to envisage a new world 
order. 
 
Within the new international system, not all members of the League of 
Nations were territorial states; the most powerful ones were world-spanning 
empires. Historians have shown that the transition from empire to statehood 
implied more continuities than previously conceded.17 Conceptually, the rise 
of the political space of the state did not eradicate the legacy of the age of 
empire, which continued to inform and influence some British and American 
IR thinkers in the early twentieth century.18 At the time when statehood 
emerged as the key condition for international political recognition, Zimmern 
and his colleagues at the pro-imperial Round Table organization outlined 
alternative orders that circumvented the territorial state and relied on the 
legacy of the British Empire as a transnational polity.19 Empires were sites 
of political power and experience, that Zimmern wanted to employ to 
challenge the prevalence of the nation-state. The inequalities and 
hierarchies that characterised the imperial world order permeated the new 
international order, most evidently in the system of trusteeships, which was 
presented as an escalator to independence and statehood, but in practice 
tended to preserve the power of the European empires.20   
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The political vision advanced by Zimmern distinguished between statehood 
and nationhood to reject the primacy of the nation-state in world politics. 
Tomohito Baji suggests that Zimmern envisaged the separation of 
nationhood from statehood as a means to undermine national self-
determination, and advocated the foundation of multi-national 
Commonwealths, built according to the British imperial model, and 
extended over vast territories.21 Thus, the space of the state was not limited, 
for him, by its physical territoriality, but depended on transnational bonds 
that connected individuals all over the world. Zimmern’s vision of de-
territorialised world order reflected an important challenge to the centrality 
of the nation-state to international relations theory. His ideas embody an 
alternative trajectory for spatial thinking in IR, which divorces cultural and 
symbolic bonds from territorial statehood.  
 
The attempt of Alfred Zimmern to reimagine the nation-state as part of a 
global order based on the historical experience of the British Commonwealth 
exemplifies the permeation of empire to international thought. While the 
influence of imperialism on international thought should not be over-stated, 
Zimmern was certainly not alone in drawing inspiration from the experience 
of empire to outline the contours of a new international system. Historians 
of political thought have already interrogated the entanglement of the 
discipline of IR with imperialism.22 Transnational institutions across the 
British Empire, such as the Round Table organization, have been sites of 
knowledge production and exchange across different political and cultural 
locations, and contributed to shaping ideas about the world’s political 
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spatiality.23 South Africa, Australia, Canada and India were not imagined 
merely as members of the British Commonwealth, but as parts of a global 
spatial order characterised by political and cultural bonds that transcended 
the logics of statehood.24 When shifting the gaze from the nation-state to the 
global sphere, early IR scholars found a trove of practical and theoretical 
knowledge in the malleable and expanding political space of empire. For 
scholars like Zimmern, the imperial sphere provided concrete knowledge 
about political relations beyond the nation-state, as well as a symbolic site 
of identity.25 In the discipline’s early years, imperial knowledge and 
expertise carried, as Hobson, Long and Bell have noted, an important weight 
in shaping international theory in nineteenth and twentieth century 
Britain.26 Yet imperial thought, as Vitalis demonstrated, extended beyond 
the geopolitical sphere of the British empire; American academic study of IR 
was implicated in the justification of colonialism and white supremacism 
until the age of decolonization in the 1960s. Alternative views, proposed by 
black IR scholars, were erased from the history of the discipline in the 
United States.27  
 
In the United States and Britain alike, the experience of empire excreted a 
lasting influence on ideas about ‘race development’ and ‘colonial 
administration’, which remained an integral part of international thinking in 
the first century of IR. While Zimmern repudiated the racial aspect of 
imperial heritage, he hoped to resolve the tensions of international relations 
by separating statehood from nationality and creating a global 
commonwealth inspired by the British Empire. Yet others had different 
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plans for reforming the space of the nation-state. The historian and 
International Relations scholar E. H. Carr shared Zimmern’s concern with 
the desirability and possibility of a state-centric international order, but 
became his most ferocious critic.28 Carr highlighted the insufficiency of the 
states’ system to overcome challenges such as war and economic crisis, and 
emphasised the need for different spatial perspectives.29 But he did not look 
back to the age of empire for inspiration for political reform. Rather, his 
global thinking sought to transcend and overcome the experience of empire, 
resonating with a new form of global spatiality that would thrive after the 
Second World War. 
 
The last chapter of Carr’s influential account of the crisis of the League 
system, The Twenty Years’ Crisis was dedicated to ‘the prospects of a new 
international order’. After criticising the ‘utopias’ of economic rationalism 
and universal progress, Carr turned his attention to the future of the 
nation-state as ‘a unit of power’, ‘the supreme unit round which centre 
human demands for equality and human ambitions for predominance’.30 
The League’s founding principle, the equality of nation-states, was an 
illusion, according to Carr. His solution sought to disentangle power from 
the territorial space of the nation-state and create larger continental blocs 
with centralized power. This idea was motivated not only by the disastrous 
effects of belligerent nationalistic ideologies, but also by political and 
economic tendencies towards interdependence and integration. 
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While Carr recognised the importance of the political space of the nation-
state for the construction of a new international order, he did not lose sight 
of another dimension of human life, the global. In Nationalism and After 
(1945) he followed the political theorist David Mitrany and proposed a 
functionalist vision of world order.31 In wartime London, Mitrany had 
developed his functionalist approach as an alternative to territorially-based 
international order. Functionalism sought to identify humanity’s ‘concrete 
needs’ and address them through a transnational collaborative network of 
agencies and organization with specific functions. This approach allowed 
Mitrany and Carr to shift their gaze from the political space of the nation-
state and imagine a new political system that could extend without limits, 
even reaching the whole globe. Thus, without committing themselves to 
‘utopian’ visions of world government, Carr and Mitrany found in 
functionalism a flexible international system that recognized the potentially 
world-changing rise of a different political space, the global.  
 
The global political space  
 
It may be tempting to associate the emergence of the global political space 
with the end of the Cold War and the accelerated processes of globalization, 
that have encouraged IR scholars to review and contest the centrality of the 
state to IR theory.32 For some, the new globalized political space was 
characterised by the extension of the American model of liberal democracy 
to the entire world.33 Yet global thinking has deeper historical and 
conceptual roots.34 Since the mid-twentieth century, world-making 
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transformations following the growth of communication and transport 
technologies have reinforced a common perception of shrinking distance, 
porous borders and planetary unity that undermined the centrality of the 
nation-state as a hub of power and authority in international affairs. 35 
Through debates about its nature, prospects and meaning, the global 
political space emerged as a major domain of political relations.36 
 
What is the global political space? The Oxford Dictionary defines the global 
as ‘relating to the whole world, worldwide’. Such a definition captures the 
scale and scope of the global political space, but requires additional 
clarification of meaning and interpretation. What may be the implications of 
the worldwide scope of the global for thinking about politics? Sylvest and 
van Munster suggest a complementary term that can help make sense of the 
global political space: ‘globality’. The dictionary definition of globality is ‘the 
quality of being global; universality, totality; specifically the quality of having 
worldwide inclusiveness, reach, or relevance; (the potential for) global 
integration, operation, or influence (especially in business and financial 
contexts).’ For Sylvest and van Munster, globality means the circumstances 
in which the entire world is regarded as a ‘single place’.37 This definition 
enriches the notion of the global by highlighting its major normative 
characteristic: the material perception of the ‘oneness’ of the planet as a 
significant condition of human action.   
 
The notion of ‘globality’ often operates in conjunction with ‘globalism’, which 
refers to ‘the operation or planning of economic and foreign policy on a 
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global basis’, according to the Oxford Dictionary. Van Munster and Sylvest 
draw a distinction between the ideology of globalism and the condition of 
globality. Yet in the history of international thought, the boundary between 
these two concepts has often been blurry. ‘Globality’ is not ideologically 
neutral: it often entails an explicit or implicit normative position about the 
desirability of an order grounded in the global political space. Moreover, 
globalism should not be seen as a coherent ideology.38 Globalism, I suggest, 
is better understood as a loose and flexible approach to politics which 
emphasizes the material ‘oneness’ of the world and seeks to reorganize 
international relations on a worldwide scale. 
 
The ‘global’ differs from the ‘international’, ‘transnational’ and ‘cosmopolitan’ 
political spaces. All four categories make their appearance in twentieth 
century writings on international politics, in content if not by name. The 
‘international’ political space attributes importance to the nation as a 
defining order-creating unit, and explores the relations between nation-
states as sovereign entities. Thus, the international space replicates rather 
than repudiates the logic of state-centrism discussed in the previous 
section. The transnational space extends beyond the state’s boundaries and 
explores interconnections across borders without undermining the 
significance of national communities and states. By contrast, the political 
category of cosmopolitanism assumes that all humans belong to a world 
community and should adapt their political and moral allegiances 
accordingly. While the cosmopolitan approach focuses on individual identity 
and underlines the universal dimension of ethics, the global approach is less 
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morally ambitious, and highlights problems capable of affecting every part of 
the world, without implying political monism or moral unity.39 
 
Many thinkers of different political, theoretical and ideological positions may 
be described as globalists for their embrace of global perspectives on 
political order, including Raymond Aron, David Mitrany, Barbara Wootton, 
Friedrich Hayek, Lionel Robbins, Owen Lattimore, Nicholas Spykman, E. H. 
Carr, Hans Morgenthau, John Herz, Jacques Maritain, and Barbara Ward. 
They identified globality as a meaningful condition of world politics, and 
proposed plans to adjust the existing international order accordingly. 
Thinking globally does not mean ignoring all other spatial domains of 
politics: those who espoused the globalist approach highlighted connections 
between different political spaces, and advanced visions recognising the 
complex interplay between the local, national, regional, federal and global 
spaces.  
 
The pivotal moment in the emergence of globalism was the mid-twentieth 
century, when the term ‘global’ started to gain ground in public debates and 
scholarly publications as a response to the total world war.40 For many mid-
century political thinkers, such as Raymond Aron, the global war required 
an adequately global plan for peacetime order: the interests of the whole 
world should guide post-war planning of a new international order.41 In the 
1940s, the growing awareness of the world’s oneness depended also on 
novel technologies that presented the image of the world from a bird’s-eye 
perspective, and on new cartographic projections that transformed 
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conceptions of geography and space.42 The global imaginary of a unified and 
closely-knit political space outlived the war as a perspective on the future of 
humanity.43 Thus, I argue, in the first century of IR, the ‘global’ political 
space was employed by a range of political thinkers who sought to challenge 
the nation-state as the pivotal unit of political order in the name of a 
political vision that encapsulated the world as a whole.  
 
The global political space embodies an alternative account of modernity, 
that challenges the idea that the territorial nation-state represents the final 
stage of human progress.44 Thinking globally has meant, for twentieth 
century thinkers, widening the political imagination beyond the structure of 
the nation-state to reflect on the various political spaces of the world. 
Cartographic images, maps, and air travel technologies enhanced the notion 
of the ‘oneness’ of the world. Mid-century American geopolitical thinkers, 
such as Nicholas J. Spykman and Owen Lattimore, drew on novel 
cartographic projections, developed by the American cartographer Richard 
Ede Harrison, and proposed geopolitical visions that underscored the need 
for a political response to the world’s material globality.45 The nuclear 
bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 mark another 
important milestone in the consolidation of a global perspective on politics. 
The atomic bombs were perceived as a danger of global scale, which 
implicated potentially all parts of the world.46 ‘Earthrise’, the image of planet 
Earth captured by Apollo 8 astronaut Bill Anders in 1968, furthered the 
perception of global ‘oneness’, and inspired a surge in global political 
visions.47  
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The rise of the global political space was motivated not only by material 
conditions of global interconnectedness, facilitated by flight and 
communication technologies, but also by the upsurge of totalitarian regimes 
based on universalist ideologies that sought to curb individual liberty. In the 
mid-twentieth century, key international thinkers such as E. H. Carr, Hans 
Morgenthau, David Mitrany and John Herz built on a shared perception of 
world crisis to question the political desirability of the nation-state in the 
post-war era.48 Shifting their gaze from the domestic space of the nation-
state to the global political space offered a means to envisage a more secure, 
just and peaceful power distribution in the post-war era.  
 
In Politics among Nations, Hans Morgenthau underlined the role of a 
supranational society united by common ‘moral standards of conduct’ and 
‘shared beliefs and common values’ as the premise for the stability of the 
European system of sovereign states.49 The supremacy of national allegiance 
over supranational ones brought, for him, the system’s demise.50 As for the 
future, he argued that the solution for the world’s crisis would have to be a 
global one: a ‘world state is unattainable in our world, yet indispensable for 
survival’.51 As one of the major realist thinkers of the twentieth century, 
Morgenthau’s support for a world state became a conundrum for his 
interpreters: according to Campbell Craig ‘the possibility of world 
government was so low and the risks of failure so high that the world state 
notion he [Morgenthau] put forward in Politics Among Nations was effectively 
speculation’.52 Others, like William Scheuerman, sought to underline the 
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prospective nature of Morgenthau’s global thinking, which reveals the 
important influence of Mitrany’s functionalist approach on his thought: ‘if 
nation-states worked together in pursuing concrete tasks, inventing along 
the way creative but eminently practical supranational institutions, the 
building blocks of global order could be laid.53 For Scheuerman, 
Morgenthau embodied the figure of the American left wing realist who 
proposed plans for global reform aspiring for the creation of a world state, 
but doubting the feasibility of its immediate realisation. Nonetheless, he 
identifies in Morgenthau’s writing a clear commitment to political 
investigation based on a global spatiality. 
 
John Herz’s embrace of global thinking was more congruous with his 
original interpretation of realism in international relations, which 
incorporated aspects of the liberal project of international law.54 As an 
innovative and influential mid-century international thinker in the United 
States, Herz endorsed the interwar vision of a universalist legal order of the 
Viennese jurist Hans Kelsen as a response to the global threat of nuclear 
war.55 As Sylvest argues, ‘Herz’s universalism was based on a ‘solid, cool-
headed realism’ that acknowledged how in a context of globality the 
distinction between national interest and internationalist ideals was, strictly 
speaking, invalid. They could be seen to merge in a common interest in 
survival, but this required changing perceptions and developing ‘a 
‘‘planetary mind’’’’.56 In his 1942 discussion of world order, Herz debated the 
possible realization of a world federal state, and argued that while such plan 
would not be ‘utopian’, it would require a transfer of allegiance from the 
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nation to the world state, which represented a tremendous political effort. 
Instead, he oriented his system of collective security to address power 
struggles on a global scale.57 Like Morgenthau, Herz drew inspiration from 
Mitrany’s functionalism, and emphasised the role of institutions in 
addressing global challenges, but he was much more optimistic than 
Morgenthau about the role of international law in transforming politics on a 
global scale.58 Herz and Morgenthau both embraced a global perspective on 
international relations as a response to challenges with global reach, such 
as nuclear war, without calling for the abolition of nation-states.  
 
In 1950, Herz reviewed a publication which resonated with his earlier ideas 
in favour of a world federation. It was the Preliminary Draft for a World 
Constitution, written by a group of scholars led by the University of Chicago 
professors Richard McKeon and Giuseppe Antonio Borgese, and the 
University’s president Robert Hutchins. The public constitution was the fruit 
of two years of research and deliberation, with the aim of forming a 
foundation for the eventual realization of a federal state on global scale.59 
The group of American and European humanities scholars and social 
scientists argued that organizing the world in global and regional federations 
would provide better checks on political power while enhancing democratic 
representation, pluralism and diversity. Herz’s judgment of the final 
document produced by the ‘distinguished’ scholars was generally positive: 
‘from the standpoint of world federalism this draft certainly embodies a good 
deal of careful thinking. It tries to sum up the most advanced spiritual 
aspirations of the Western and Eastern civilizations of mankind, and, 
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technically, to shape a framework of government - complete with law-
making, executive, and judicial bodies and, in addition, some novel features 
- which would combine whatever human endeavours in the field of 
government and constitutions have proved of enduring value.’ His main 
doubts regarded the project’s means of realization and the Soviet reaction: 
underlining the constitution’s excessive rationalism, he suggested that 
‘genuine realism [..] must take irrational factors into account, to build upon 
them the realizable ideal’. Thinking globally, from a realist perspective, was 
a necessity of the time, but required ‘a real change in human minds and 
attitudes’.60  
 
While the global political space reflects a degree of conceptual holism, in the 
quest for a comprehensive understanding of the political order of the world, 
it did not always imply a centralised conception of political power. Rather, 
global thinkers sought to find new ways to share and distribute power on a 
large spatial scale by imagining alternative global political orders based on 
mid-range polities, such as federations. At the British organization Federal 
Union, which was founded in 1938 to advocate for the federation of Britain 
and other democratic states, members such as Wootton, Hayek and Lionel 
Robbins argued in favour of a federal world order.61 As its original aim of 
war prevention failed, Federal Union evolved into a proto-think tank, 
proposing the formation of a post-war European or Atlantic ‘nuclear 
federation’ that would eventually evolve, they hoped, into a global one.  
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Drawing on the wartime alliance as inspiration, Wootton, Hayek and 
Robbins envisioned a federation as a response to the post-war challenges, 
such as economic growth, social welfare and, of course, peace and security. 
Significantly, the global scale of the federation was not merely a means to 
prevent war, but also reflected an advantageous scope for social and 
economic prosperity. In their debates about the desirable and possible scale 
of social and economic structures beyond, above and across nation-states, 
the members of Federal Union extended their gaze from the local to the 
global. While disagreeing on the normative aims of their plans for 
transnational federation – social welfare for Wootton and liberal capitalism 
for Hayek – these thinkers were united by their conviction that the 
appropriate scale for planning post-war order was global. As Quinn 
Slobodian has recently argued, political federation was an early version of 
Hayek’s globalist thought, which later evolved into an attempt to redeploy 
government and its regulatory powers on a global scale in the name of 
capitalist free trade. For both Wootton and Hayek, the nation-state should 
not be abolished but harnessed to an ambitious global reform project in 
favour of social justice or capitalism.62  
 
In its early- to mid-century iterations, globalism was meant to counter 
national ideologies and reconfigure the power of the nation-state, but 
thinking globally did not mean an attempt to abolish the nation-state as a 
significant unit in international politics. Rather, many global thinkers, most 
such as Barbara Wootton, Hans Morgenthau, John Herz and Alfred 
Zimmern, sought to envisage a world order in which the state and the global 
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spaces overlapped and co-existed as alternative yet not mutually exclusive 
political orders.  
 
After the Second World War, the global perspective on politics increasingly 
enhanced the inequalities that divided the world of states, and undermined 
the apparent sovereign equality that supposedly defined the post-Second 
World War order. In the 1950s and 1960s, the end of empire and the rise of 
the nation-state system in the post-colonial world saw the global space 
become an arena of contestation about social and economic equality. By 
thinking globally, political thinkers were able to challenge the structures of 
the existing international system and underline the limits of the state-
centred world order in facing the urgent economic and political problems of 
equality, development and growth.  
 
Division Lines: equality and development in international relations 
 
The global and national spaces attain their political meanings through 
divisions as well as interactions and connections. Rather than seeing the 
political spaces as homogeneous and ‘smooth’, I propose to examine the 
conceptual lines that divide them. The focus on divisions helps to make 
sense of the modus operandi of power in the national and global political 
spaces by investigating differences, tensions and instability. Through this 
lens, the political spaces of the global and the national emerge as 
hierarchical, complex and plural, spaces of contention and struggle that 
intersect in a variety of power locations. I propose to investigate here how 
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the global and national divisions generated by the concept of ‘equality’ were 
perceived by an influential economist and global thinker, Barbara Ward, in 
the mid-twentieth century.  
 
The focus on Barbara Ward is motivated by three reasons. First, she 
proposed an original mode of thinking about equality by weaving together 
the national and global spaces of politics. Second, Ward’s ideas were 
influential at the time: in an era defined by the processes of decolonization 
and the Cold War, her Economist articles and best-selling books reached a 
vast audience in Britain and the United States, and political leaders, such 
as Adlai Stevenson, John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson sought her 
advice. Finally, scholars including Glenda Sluga and Patricia Owens have 
underlined the absence of women from histories of international thought in 
the twentieth century; this lacuna will be addressed by highlighting the 
contribution of Barbara Ward to the theory of international relations.63  
 
In her 1962 bestseller, The Rich Nations and the Poor Nations, she launched 
an approach to economic development based on thinking about equality in 
the international sphere. The ‘revolutionary’ idea of equality – of men and of 
nations – entailed, for her, the ‘tap root of modern nationalism’.64 Yet its 
meaning was not always clear: ‘is it to do be only a levelling? Does it imply 
indifference to excellence? Can it be combined with reasonable lines of 
command and control?’. Regardless of these questions, she underlined 
‘men’s passionate desire to see themselves as the equals of other human 
beings without distinctions of class or sex or race or nationhood is one of 
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the driving forces of our day’. For this reason, ‘the distinction between rich 
nations and poor nations is one of the great dominant political and 
international themes of our century’.65  
 
Equality should be understood alongside the notion of ‘development’ which 
Ward helped define and popularise. The intersection of the global and the 
national revolved, for her, around the notion of ‘development’, which she 
read in both economic and political terms. Embracing the nation-state as a 
prime actor in international politics did not lead her to abandon all other 
spatial order and political allegiances: rather, development should be seen 
as a global challenge, extending well beyond the geographical reach of the 
‘poor nations’.  
 
While the book’s title refers to ‘nations’ as the political protagonists of 
international order, Ward invites her readers to measure political action on 
a global scale. The responsibility for advancing equality and development 
fell, for Ward, with poor and rich nations alike, as common inhabitants of a 
unified, close-knit planet. Through a historical analysis, a political 
programme and a call for action, Ward aimed to demonstrate the interplay 
between the national and global political spaces in the mid-twentieth 
century. It was insufficient for nation-states to attain prosperity and growth 
within their borders; inequality between states and across continents should 
also be tackled by state-led initiatives to generate prosperity, peace and 
growth.  
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Ward pursued this line of thought in a later publication, which is credited 
with popularizing and perhaps coining the term ‘spaceship earth’ (1966).66 
She described the world as a self-containing globe, a complex unit where 
natural and human life should co-exist, and envisaged national sovereignty, 
regional collaboration and global morality as the necessary spring-boards to 
sustainable global development: “Our physical unity has gone far ahead of 
our moral unity. Our inability to do anything but live together physically is 
not matched by any of the institutions that would enable us to live together 
decently”.67 On a more concrete level, Ward proposed that wealthier 
countries should commit a certain proportion of their GDP to the 
development of poorer countries, which would be administered by 
appropriate global institutions for aid and development.  
 
Writing about equality did not free Ward of political and historical prejudices 
– in fact she argued that no one was, citing anti-Western Chinese proverbs 
as evidence. The advancement of equality on a global scale required a global 
political vision based on a global moral outlook, which, in light of her 
Catholic faith, she found in the Judeo-Christian tradition. She embraced a 
simplistic account of Western-led progress, following a teleological narrative 
to emphasise the contribution of the Western or Atlantic region to the 
world’s development. Her views on imperialism seem mixed – she recognized 
the exploitation, abuse and racism of the imperial order yet underlined the 
important economic, administrative and scientific knowledge brought to the 
colonial world by its Western rulers. While she strived to capture the 
complexity of the global political and economic situation, her writings 
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sought to persuade a readership of well-off Westerners that investment in 
development of poor nations would benefit the rich.68 
 
Ward’s work provides two key insights on the national-global spatial nexus. 
First, she highlighted the ‘revolution of equality’ as an ‘idea now at work 
from one end of the world to another’.69 By emphasizing the centrality of 
equality in political as well as economic terms, Ward contributed to 
institutional discussions on global development, especially at the UN 
conference on the Human Environment (1972) connecting national 
initiatives with global reform. Thinking about the global and the national 
spaces of politics in the twentieth century requires mapping out strategies 
for interaction and collaboration. Ward’s ideas paved the way for the 
emergence of a whole field of development studies, which complemented and 
complicated the theoretical and practical apparatus of the discipline of 
International Relations. Her influence extended beyond the academic realm 
and contributed to the elaboration of the New International Economic Order 
that aimed to reform the world’s economy in the interests of developing and 
post-colonial states.70  
 
Second, Ward employed the categories of ‘development’ and ‘equality’ to 
reflect on the tensions within and across national and global spatial orders. 
The problem of inequality represented for her a challenge that revealed the 
insufficiencies of both the global and the national arenas, and the need for 
both political domains to undertake successful change in international 
relations after decolonization. Ward’s ideas reflect an attempt to 
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conceptualise the interplay of the global and national political spaces, and to 
explore ways forward in tackling key issues in world politics, notably 
sustainable development, national resources, economic growth and equality.  
 
Conclusion: How to see the world. 
 
Over the past century, national and global political spaces attained a central 
place in the political imagination of IR thinkers in the Anglo-American, or 
Euro-Atlantic, sphere. The historical exploration in this article gives rise to 
doubts about a teleological vision that conceptualises modernity in terms of 
statehood. The national and the global emerged as two analytical categories 
through which to see the world and the individuals inhabiting it, reflecting 
multiple spatial and political modernities.71 Political space provides an 
analytical lens through which to outline the contours of political, physical 
and symbolic sites of power in international relations and investigate their 
forms of interaction.  
 
Since 1919, the global space has been imagined as a response to two 
apparently contradictory trends: the erosion of state power by technological 
advances and the enhancement of state power due to national ideological 
structures. How can such contradictions be resolved? Was the global 
imaginary a response to the collapse of the national space, or was it an 
attempt to reinforce it? The above overview of key aspects in past spatial 
thinking suggests that we should not consider the national and global 
spaces as smooth, unchanging or uniform, and should not gloss over the 
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competing interpretations of their political meanings in the past century. A 
variety of normative ends – including functional system, imperial federation 
or realist reformism – have risen from the recognition of the overlapping 
spaces of the nation and the global, generating important insights for IR 
theory. Unlike the contemporary classification of normative ends as either 
‘global’ or ‘national’, the international thinkers examined above sought to 
advance a spatial interpretation based on the close interplay of these two 
domains.  
 
One of the main objectives of this article has been to demonstrate the 
flexible and mutually-constitutive dynamics of the global-national spaces as 
key analytical categories of International Relations. While contemporary 
political debates seem to suggest a dominant return to the nation-state as a 
primary domain of individual and collective allegiance, such changes should 
not erase from sight other, alternative political spaces. In the future, 
scholars of IR should continue to study the overlapping dynamics of the 
national and global spaces. The spatial perspective requires us to be open to 
complexity about the geographical and symbolic sites of power in world 
order, and to engage in a critical and dynamic examination of the multiple 
spatial images of world politics. Diverse interpretations of these spaces of 
politics may emerge, influencing decision-making and shaping individual 
and collective identities around the world. In the second century of IR, 
political spaces can provide an insightful lens through which to see the 
world.  
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